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Abstract
Deep neural networks have achieved impressive performance in many applications
but their large number of parameters lead to significant computational and storage
overheads. Several recent works attempt to mitigate these overheads by designing
compact networks using pruning of connections. However, we observe that most of
the existing strategies to design compact networks fail to preserve network robust-
ness against adversarial examples. In this work, we rigorously study the extension
of network pruning strategies to preserve both benign accuracy and robustness of
a network. Starting with a formal definition of the pruning procedure, including
pre-training, weights pruning, and fine-tuning, we propose a new pruning method
that can create compact networks while preserving both benign accuracy and ro-
bustness. Our method is based on two main insights: (1) we ensure that the training
objectives of the pre-training and fine-tuning steps match the training objective of
the desired robust model (e.g., adversarial robustness/verifiable robustness), and
(2) we keep the pruning strategy agnostic to pre-training and fine-tuning objectives.
We evaluate our method on four different networks on the CIFAR-10 dataset and
measure benign accuracy, empirical robust accuracy, and verifiable robust accuracy.
We demonstrate that our pruning method can preserve on average 93% benign
accuracy, 92.5% empirical robust accuracy, and 85.0% verifiable robust accuracy
while compressing the tested network by 10×.
1 Introduction
Machine learning, fueled by the recent advances in deep neural networks, has made tremendous
progress in many real-world applications [36, 9, 18, 20, 26, 34, 48, 31, 4, 41]. However, existing deep
neural networks face two key challenges. First, existing neural networks are not compact, i.e, they
have millions of parameters that lead to high computational and memory storage costs [5, 17, 24].
Such overheads hinder the deployment of these networks in resource-constrained environments such
as embedded systems, mobile, or IoT devices [17, 15, 54, 30]. The second challenge is the threat of
adversarial examples [11, 28, 40, 6, 57, 2, 21], where an adversary introduce small input perturbations
during inference inducing misclassifications. These attacks have sparked a line of research enhancing
the security of neural networks against adversarial examples [42, 28, 38, 57, 46, 45]. However
existing works on improving compactness and adversarial robustness focus on these challenges in
isolation. We believe that these two challenges must be considered in conjunction for creating safe,
compact, and efficient neural networks. Along this direction, we ask the following key question: Is it
possible to achieve both high compactness and robustness in a single neural network?
Existing works on network compression [22, 17, 24, 16, 13] typically follow a common strategy to
achieve compactness: pre-train a network and then iteratively prune and fine-tune the network to
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preserve benign accuracy. One of the most successful existing pruning strategies is weight-magnitude-
based pruning [17, 16, 24, 10] where network parameters with the smallest weight magnitude are
pruned. Multiple previous works [24, 17, 16, 13] have demonstrated the success of this pruning
strategy at preserving benign accuracy with very high compression ratios. However, except another
concurrent research work [51], none of these works studied the effect of such pruning strategies on
the adversarial robustness of the pruned network. In this paper, we carefully study such interactions.
Following pre-training, network pruning and fine-tuning are two key processes for creating compact
networks, where former reduce network size while latter preserve performance after pruning. We
first perform ablation studies where we investigate the impact of network pruning on robustness
without any fine-tuning. Next, we investigate the integration of robust training mechanisms [28, 45]
with both fine-tuning and pruning. However, as highlighted in multiple previous works [59, 23, 10],
the use of the fine-tuning step incurs an additional computational overhead. The overhead is even
higher with robust fine-tuning because it has significantly more complexity than natural training [28].
Therefore, it is natural to ask whether fine-tuning with a less computationally intensive objective
(such as fine-tuning with natural training) can successfully preserve robustness? In addition, the
question of whether it is even feasible to design a compact and robust neural network by following a
robust fine-tuning strategy is also an open one.
Finally, even if the integration of robust training mechanisms with the full compression pipeline does
result in robust networks, it will be further necessary to answer whether it has any advantage over
robustly training a compact network from scratch? In this work, we answer these questions with the
following contributions.
Contributions. (1) Our first contribution is to demonstrate that adversarial robustness of a network
is almost as stable as benign accuracy, i.e., with increasing pruning ratios, the percentage decrease
in both are similar in the absence of any fine-tuning step. 2) Following this, we show that due to
the imbalance between training objective at pre-training and fine-tuning, when existing pruning and
(benign) fine-tuning techniques are applied to a robustly trained network, the pruned network fails
to provide robustness. Next, we show that when the fine-tuning objective is modified to be similar
to the training step in adversarially robust or verifiably robust training, the network can maintain
robustness up to compression ratios as large as 10×. On average we are able to preserve up to 93%
benign accuracy, 92.5% empirical robust accuracy, and 85.0% verifiable robust accuracy for 10×
compression ratio. (3) Finally, we demonstrate the advantage of the proposed compression pipeline
over the baseline approach of training a compact network from scratch. While previous work has
shown that pruning is advantageous in the context of benign network accuracy [24, 17], we show that
in the context of empirical robust accuracy, the advantage over the baseline is even larger (up to 3.8%
and 10% improvement in robust and benign accuracy, respectively).
2 Background and related work
For image classification, the objective of deep neural networks is to learn an accurate classification
of input images (X ) as true labels (Y). This is often achieved by minimizing the empirical loss
L(θ,X ,Y) over the training dataset, where θ refers to the network parameters.
Adversarial examples. Multiple previous works [11, 40, 6, 2] have demonstrated the success of
adversarial examples, where an imperceptible perturbation () is added to the input at inference time.
The goal of the adversary is to get this adversarial example misclassified. Multiple adversarial attacks
have been proposed to generate a successful perturbation under different constraints [11, 6, 28, 3].
We focus on attacks that utilize signed projected gradient descent [28] to solve the underlying
optimization problem for generating the perturbation.
Adversarial robustness. This line of research aims to search for network parameters that minimize
L(θ,X ,Y) while maintaining robustness to adversarial attacks. This objective is often achieved by
solving a robust optimization problem [28, 42, 57, 38, 35], where the loss is minimized over both
benign and adversarial inputs. It has been noted previously that training with stronger adversary often
leads to higher robustness against adversarial attacks [42, 28, 57]. However, since such robustness is
only evaluated with gradient-based attacks, it is often referred as empirical robustness.
Verifiable robustness. Another line of research called verifiably robust training [45, 52, 29, 12, 32]
aims to empower the neural networks to have verified robustness. Verifiably robust training first uses
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sound verification techniques [47, 19, 46, 33, 8, 50, 56] to over-approximate the output of neural
networks and then learns the parameters to minimize L(θ,X ,Y) with provable robustness properties.
However, they struggle to scale up to large networks and datasets. In this paper, we use MixTrain,
a recent approach by Wang et al. [45], to obtain verifiably robust networks since it can scale up to
moderately large networks. Note that our method is generic and thus can be used with any other
verifiably robust training technique.
Neural network Pruning. The success of neural network pruning in achieving highly compact
networks has been explored in multiple previous works [22, 17, 16, 59, 13, 10, 23, 25]. The key
strategy in all these works is to first train a network followed by pruning and fine-tuning steps. The
pruning process could be a single step or iterative pruning, followed by a fine-tuning process.
Following the classification made by Liu et al. [25], pruning strategies can be divided into two
categories: structured and unstructured pruning. In structured pruning, the objective is to prune
multiple filters or neurons in convolutional and fully connected layer respectively. This makes the
network compact by effectively reducing the size of each layer. In unstructured pruning, the objective
is to only prune connection between neurons, which make the weight matrices in each layer sparse.
Robustness vs Compactness. A closely related line of research direction focus on how network
compression by itself impact the robustness of the network against adversarial attacks [49, 14, 7,
27, 49, 58]. In contrast, our works focus on achieving highly compressed networks while achieving
robustness in parallel using state-of-the-art adversarial defenses. Another closely related work is
Wijayanto et al. [51], where the authors primarily focus on a specific compactness strategy called
quantization. In contrast, our work focus on achieving compactness through network pruning.
Additionally, our work considers much stronger attacks, both empirical and verified notions of
robustness, and follows both structured and unstructured pruning strategies.
3 Methodology
Formalizing network compression using pruning. Designing compact neural networks using
pruning is often a two-step process: network pre-training and fine-tuning. A typical optimization
strategy for both steps is as follows:
Step-1: Pre-training
θˆp = argminθLp(θ,X, Y ) (1)
Step-2: Pruning with Fine-tuning
θˆf = argminθLf (θ,X, Y ) (2)
s.t. 1− ||θ||0||θˆp||0
≤ t (3)
Where θ,X, Y refers to network weight parameters, training images, and labels respectively. In the
pre-training step, the network is trained following standard Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) [44,
43]. Specifically, the goal is to find the weights θˆp that will minimize the pre-training loss objective
Lp over the training dataset. In step-2, based on the pre-trained weights θˆp, the fine-tuning objective
is to minimize another objective loss Lf to maintain the network performance while also pruning
network connections to achieve compactness. The objective for network pruning is modeled by
adding a constraint on the sparsity of network parameters (θ). In general the constraint is to prune a
fraction (t) of the weight parameters obtained from pre-training (θˆp) i.e., 1− ||θ||0/||θˆp||0 ≤ t.
To solve the optimization problem in step-2, the widely used approach is to solve the fine-tuning
objective (Equation 2) and pruning constraint (Equation 3) alternatively. This requires multiple
iterations, each pruning out a small fraction of network weights and minimizing the fine-tuning loss
objective Lf with pruned weights. For each iteration j, a pruning mask M j is first applied to weights
θj achieving the newly pruned weights M j  θj , where  refers to element-wise multiplication.
Then θj+1 is optimized as argminθLf (θ,X, Y ) with θ initialized with M j  θj . Such alternative
iterations continue until the pruning ratio reaches the targeted threshold t.
Pruning mask M has binary entries where a zero entry implies that the corresponding connection
of the network is pruned. With structured pruning, instead of individual connections, individual
filters and neurons from convolutional and fully connected layers are pruned respectively. Thus for
structured pruning, the binary entries correspond to whether an individual filter/neuron is pruned.
Next we discuss the methodology for our experiments in light of the aforementioned formalization.
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Pruning without fine-tuning. To preserve network performance, step-2 includes both pruning and
fine-tuning processes. In the absence of network fine-tuning (i.e., we simply prune away a specific
number of connections), one can characterize how robust current neural networks are to network
pruning without any fine-tuning steps. With both structured and unstructured pruning, we will study
the stability of network robustness with network pruning (without fine-tuning) and compare it with
previously observed stability of benign accuracy [24, 17].
Balancing pre-training and fine-tuning objectives. The generic formulation of network pruning
allows minimizing a different loss objective in both pre-training and fine-tuning steps (Equation 1, 2).
In previous work, where the challenge was to preserve benign accuracy, both Lp, Lf are selected
following natural training [17, 16, 24, 13]. However, preserving robustness for compact networks
requires integration with robust training. Our initial experiments investigated the effect of when
fine-tuning loss objective (Lf ) is selected without accounting for pre-training loss objective (Lp).
We demonstrate the limitation of network pruning when there exist such imbalance between the two
objectives. Following this, we evaluate the robustness of a compact network when both pre-training
and fine-tuning loss objectives are similar to each other.
To satisfy constraint 3, we follow weight magnitude based pruning approach where the connections
with smaller weight magnitude are pruned away. With structured pruning, this implies pruning
the filter with the least l1-norm. Previous works have highlighted the success of this heuristic
in preserving network benign accuracy. We aim to demonstrate that such heuristic can maintain
properties beyond benign accuracy, such as empirical and verifiable robustness.
Advantage over training compact networks from scratch. It can be noted that the fine-tuning steps
in the aforementioned formulation further adds additional computation cost after pre-training. When
such cost is undesirable, it is natural to question whether network pruning has any advantage over
training a compact network from scratch [28]. We construct these baseline networks by removing
an equal fraction of filter or neurons randomly from each layer and then robustly training from
scratch. We compare this with compact networks achieved with structured pruning where the pruning
algorithm decides which filter or neuron to remove. We present these results in Section 7.
4 Experimental setup
In our experiments, we report results with both unstructured and structure pruning methods on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. The key networks trained with these datasets are VGG16 [37], Wide-ResNet-28-
5 [55] CIFAR-large [19], and All-convolutional network [39]. All networks are trained with SGD
with starting learning rate of 0.1, with a step-wise decay by a factor of 10 after 50, 75, and 90% of
the training epochs. The momentum coefficient is 0.0001 along with a batch size of 128. We use
the standard data augmentation procedures use in previous works for each dataset. The codebase is
implemented in PyTorch [1]. We will further make our code public for reproducibility of research.
For adversarial attacks, we use signed projected gradient descent where maximum perturbations
budget, per-step perturbation, and the number of iterations are 8, 2, and 10 respectively. This
design choice is motivated by their success in previous works [28, 38]. We use similar attack
parameters for adversarial training of the networks. Similar to previous works [28, 53] we only
include adversarial examples in training. For verifiably robust training, we use MixTrain with
the best-reported hyperparameters in [45] i.e., k and alpha to be 10 and 0.7. Following previous
works [46, 45, 19, 52], we choose the maximum perturbation budget of 2 for verifiably robust training.
For network pruning, we use the iterative pruning strategy. After pre-training, we use 40 pruning
steps, each step followed by 5 fine-tuning epochs. The learning rate is selected as 0.001 and other
hyper-parameters are kept the same as pre-training.
Metrics: Following the definitions in [45], we use three different performance metrics: benign
accuracy, empirical robust accuracy (era), and verifiable robust accuracy (vra). The benign accuracy
refers to network accuracy with the non-modified inputs. Era measures the percentage of test samples
that are robust under gradient-based attacks (PGD attacks if not specified). vra measures the fraction
of test samples that are verified to be robust by network verification methods in [45, 52].
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(a) Adversarially trained VGG16 network.
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(b) Verifiably trained CIFAR-large network
Figure 1: Degradation of key performance metrics with increasing pruning ratios for unstructured (top) and
structured (bottom) pruning without any fine-tuning.
5 Experiments: understanding network pruning for robust networks
5.1 Impact of pruning without fine-tuning on robustly trained networks
In this section, we present the impact of network pruning on performance when no fine-tuning process
is used. It highlights how stable each performance metric is when a fraction of connections are pruned
from the network. We report stability of each of these three metrics: Benign accuracy, era, and vra.
Fig. 1 shows the stability of each of these metrics for both unstructured and structured pruning. We
observe that the robustness of the network is almost as stable as its benign accuracy. For example,
for adversarially trained VGG16 network era decreases by 5% of its original value at 49% and 28%
pruning ratios for unstructured and structured pruning respectively. In contrast, the benign accuracy
decreases by 5% of its original value at 59% and 34% pruning ratios respectively. Similarly, for
CIFAR-large network, we observe that both benign accuracy and vra decrease by 5% at 49% pruning
ratio for both structured and unstructured pruning.
5.2 Imbalance between pruning and fine-tuning objectives
In the previous section, we show that even though network robustness is stable at low pruning ratios, it
sharply degrades at higher pruning ratios. To preserve robustness at higher pruning ratios, the pruned
network should be fine-tuned. In this section, we demonstrate that an imbalance between network
pre-training and fine-tuning loss objective will lead to poor robustness of the compact network.
Following the formulation of designing a compact networks (Equation 1, 2), multiple choices for
the loss objective Lp, Lf exist. To achieve compact and robust networks, we select the network
pre-training loss (Lp) from either of adversarial training or verifiably robust training.
Table 1: Fine-tuning with different k in MixTrain for an network
pre-trained with k=10. We report vra with different unstructured
pruning ratios.
Pruning ratio (%) 50 72 84 90 92 95 98
MixTrain k=1 50.5 43.5 43.5 41.5 39.5 34.5 19.0
MixTrain k=10 51.0 47.0 48.5 45.5 41.0 40.5 28.5
Fig. 2a highlights the impact of imbal-
ance between training objective for a
network pre-trained using adversarial
training [28] and fine-tuned using nat-
ural training. Though the benign accu-
racy of the network is preserved, era
decreases significantly with increas-
ing pruning ratios. The effect could
be attributed to the reason that natural training doesn’t consider any adversary in its loss objective.
Fine-tuning with it for a smaller number of epochs i.e., low pruning ratio, keeps the robustness intact.
However, with the increasing number of epochs, the fine-tuning updates of network dominate as the
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(c) Fine-tuning with adversarial
training on a verifiably trained
CIFAR-large network
Figure 2: Degradation of network robustness with increasing pruning ratios when fine-tuning objective is not
balanced with training objective of the pre-trained network.
network robustness quickly degrades to zero. We present the detailed results with different choices of
Lp and Lf in Supplementary Section A, B.
Fig. 2b, 2c report the results for a verifiably robust network fine-tuned with natural training and
adversarial training respectively. In both experiments, vra sharply decreases at very low pruning ratios.
However, the properties aligned with fine-tuning objectives are preserved. For example, fine-tuning
with natural and adversarial training are able to maintain the benign accuracy and era respectively
up to large pruning ratios but failed to preserve vra. Even with fine-tuning using verifiably robust
training, we show that difference in adversary’s strength can lead to a large difference in robustness
of the resulted compact network. For example, verifiably robust training with MixTrain [45] allows
an increase in strength of adversary with parameter k (the larger, the stronger robustness MixTrain
can provide). Table 1 reports the results with k = 1, 10 where the network pre-training is performed
with k = 10. We can see that the difference in verifiable robustness for both adversaries gets more
pronounced with an increase in pruning ratio.
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Figure 3: For verifiably trained CIFAR-
large network, sharp decrease in vra with a
very small number of fine-tuning epoch using
natural training without network pruning.
Why vra sharply degrades with natural fine-tuning?
Since we follow an iterative pruning approach, Fig. 2b, 2c
show that fine-tuning the verifiable robust network for a
few epochs with natural or adversarial training objective
leads to significant loss of verifiable robustness. However,
these results include both network pruning and fine-steps.
In Figure 3, we study how vra changes with different
epochs of fine-tuning with natural training in the absence
of pruning. We can see that within only five epochs, vra
decrease from 51% to 6.5%.
The natural question to ask now is whether the regu-
lar/benign loss objective truly conflicts with the verifi-
able robust loss objective? We take the same verifiably
pre-trained robust network and measure the difference of
gradients over the whole training set used to update its
weights by verifiable robust fine-tuning and regular fine-tuning respectively. In Figure 4, we show
on average 52% of the weight gradients obtained by these two objectives are actually pointing to
conflicting directions (e.g., verifiable robust loss points to positive direction while regular loss points
to negative direction on updating one weight).
6 Integrating compactness and robustness
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Figure 4: Conflict in weight updates of nat-
ural and verifiably robust fine-tuning for an
verifiably robust networks.
To preserve network robustness, we argue that it is critical
to integrate the robust training objective in the network
compression pipeline (Section 3). However, as highlighted
in the previous section, using an imbalanced training ob-
jective in the network compression phase fails to preserve
robustness. Now we demonstrate that selecting similar
objectives in both pre-training and fine-tuning can suc-
cessfully lead to robust and highly compact models.
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6.1 Preserving empirical robustness
In this section, we demonstrate the success of fine-tuning based on adversarial training in preserving
both benign accuracy and empirical robustness of the neural network with increasing pruning
ratios. Each network in this experiment is pre-trained with adversarial training. The key results for
unstructured and structured pruning are presented in Table 2, 3 respectively. We report results with
three different fine-tuning strategies. First, we show the baseline results where no fine-tuning is
performed (None). Next, we capture the impact of fine-tuning based on natural training (Nat). Finally,
we demonstrate the success of fine-tuning with a similar objective as pre-training i.e., fine-tuning
with adversarial training (Robust).
With both unstructured and structure pruning, we observe that Robust fine-tuning leads to the
best results for era. For unstructured pruning, era decreases only up to 3.5% up for up to 10×
compression ratio for VGG16 network. The improvement is even larger for unstructured pruning
where the decrease in era is only up to 1.7% and 0.4% for VGG16 and WRN-28-5 respectively. In
addition to era, the benign accuracy is also preserved to some extent with higher pruning ratios. For
example, the decrease in benign accuracy is only 3.2% for VGG16 at 10× compression ratios with
unstructured pruning. Note that though Robust pruning strategy preserves the network robustness, it
also effectively suffers from the capacity vs. accuracy trade-off [28] in adversarial training. This the
reason why the network accuracy starts degrading to large extents when capacity is increased while
robustness is preserved. We will discuss it in further detail in Section 7.
We observe that the benign accuracy is comparatively difficult to preserve with structured pruning
than unstructured pruning. With a compression ratio of 10×, the benign accuracy is at least 9% lower
for structured pruning compared to unstructured pruning. However, the network era is comparatively
degraded less with structured pruning. We speculate that aggressive pruning ratios along with small
decay in robustness could be the key factor in a large decrease in benign accuracy.
Table 2: Summary of key results with unstructured pruning approach on adversarially trained networks.
Network Pruningratio (%) ERA* (%)
ERA (%) ACC* (%) ACC (%)None Nat Robust None Nat Robust
VGG16
50
43.3
40.0 31.8 41.4
81.6
78.1 84.9 80.9
75 28.4 32.9 40.8 63.2 85.9 80.2
90 10.0 22.9 39.8 10.0 86.1 78.4
Wide-Resnet
28-5
50
42.6
33.4 36.4 41.1
85.1
80.9 86.6 85.0
75 16.6 28.6 39.8 56.4 87.0 84.7
90 7.8 12.1 39.7 10.2 88.1 84.5
∗ denotes the era and benign accuracy of pre-trained robust networks.
Table 3: Summary of key results with structured pruning approach on adversarially trained networks.
Network Pruningratio (%) ERA* (%)
ERA (%) ACC* (%) ACC (%)None Nat Robust None Nat Robust
VGG16
50
43.3
19.0 29.3 45.3
81.6
39.5 86.5 80.5
75 10.0 2.8 47.6 10.0 87.9 78.5
90 10.0 0.0 41.6 10.0 86.4 69.0
Wide-Resnet
28-5
50
42.6
10.0 4.2 44.5
85.1
14.7 89.8 82.3
75 10.0 0.0 43.6 10.0 89.7 76.1
90 10.0 0.0 34.3 10.0 87.6 64.4
∗ denotes the era and benign accuracy of pre-trained robust networks.
6.2 Preserving verifiable robustness
In this section, we demonstrate the success of fine-tuning based on verifiably robust training with
MixTrain in preserving the benign accuracy and vra with increasing pruning ratios. The networks
evaluated in this section are pre-trained using MixTrain. Similar to previous section we report the two
baselines metric, None and Nat. Fine-tuning based on verifiably robust training is referred as Robust.
The key results for unstructured and structured pruning are presented in Table 4, 5 respectively. These
results highlight that fine-tuning with MixTrain is highly successful in preserving vra. As shown in
Table 4 for unstructured pruning, robust fine-tuning only decreases by 4.5% from the original vra
with compression ratio of 10×. The decrease in benign accuracy is also comparatively small for
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unstructured pruning. For structured pruning, vra and benign accuracy drop to 35.5% and 59.5% from
51% and 73.4%, but it is still a relatively small decrease, compared to other fine-tuning strategies.
We experiment with different network architectures and observe a similar trend. With all-
convolutional (ALL-CNN) network, though the performance of the pre-trained network is relatively
poor compared to CIFAR-large network, the benign accuracy and vra don’t degrade to a large extent
for very high pruning ratios. We omit results for 90% pruning ratio as all filters get pruned out in
some layers at this pruning ratio.
Table 4: Key results for unstructured pruning approach on verifiably robust networks trained with MixTrain..
Network Pruningratio (%) VRA*(%)
VRA (%) ACC*(%) ACC (%)None Nat Robust None Nat Robust
CIFAR-large
50
51.0
49.5 6.5 51.0
73.4
68.3 80.3 73.3
75 34.2 2.1 48.6 47.4 82.0 73.2
90 13.5 2.0 45.5 10.8 80.9 66.9
CIFAR-ALL-CNN
50
42.3
42.5 1.4 34.1
60.0
56.5 66.0 55.6
75 32.7 0.0 35.3 36.1 70.7 53.7
90 17.0 0.0 34.2 16.8 68.9 51.2
∗ denotes the vra and benign accuracy of pre-trained robust networks.
Table 5: Key results for structured pruning approach on verifiably robust networks trained with MixTrain.
Network Pruningratio (%) VRA* (%)
VRA (%) ACC* (%) ACC (%)None Nat Robust None Nat Robust
CIFAR-large
50
51.0
46.5 3.5 47.5
73.4
68.4 80.2 72.7
75 32.5 0.0 44.5 47.6 80.2 70.5
90 9.0 0.0 35.5 24.1 75.5 59.5
CIFAR-ALL-CNN 50 42.3 11.9 0.6 35.6 60.0 17.7 67.5 54.275 9.9 0.0 23.5 10.0 50.7 36.8
∗ denotes the vra and benign accuracy of pre-trained robust networks.
7 Advantage of pruning to achieve compact networks
Table 6: Comparison of two distinct approaches to obtain compact
models. First one is the methodology proposed in this paper (fine-
tuned) while in the second method a compact model is trained from
scratch (scratch). The current results are for structured pruning
approach for VGG16 network.
Pruning
ratio (%)
Benign accuracy (%) ERA (%)
scratch fine-tuned scratch fine-tuned
50 78.3 80.5 44.9 45.3
75 72.1 75.5 42.7 47.6
90 59.2 69.0 37.8 41.6
In this section we quantify the benefits
of network compression pipeline to
designing compact networks by com-
paring it with compact models which
are trained from scratch i.e., no pre-
training and iterative fine-tuning strat-
egy are used. With the baseline ap-
proach i.e., compact network trained
from scratch, we observe that with
large pruning ratios, the benign accu-
racy and robustness are significantly
lower than the original network (Table 6). This highlights the trade-off curve which is observed
in previous works [28]. However, we show that following the approach of network pruning and
fine-tuning the impact of the trade-off can be significantly reduced. For example, the proposed
approach is able to improve benign accuracy by approximately 10% when the network capacity is
reduced by a factor of 10×. Similarly, era of the network is improved by 3.8% over the baseline.
We also observe that pruning is advantageous over training from scratch, but the gains are much
higher if robustness also need to be preserved along with benign accuracy. For example, if the
objective is to only maintain benign accuracy, the relative benefits in accuracy over the baseline
approach is only 4.2% for 10× decrease in capacity (detailed results in Table 7 in supplementary
material). However, with a strictly harder objective i.e., when both benign accuracy and robustness
needs to be preserved, the proposed methods bring as much as 10% improvement in benign accuracy
over the baselines.
8
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extensively studied the relationship between neural network compactness and
robustness. First, we observe that existing network pruning methods fail to achieve both compact and
robust networks. We provide extensive insights into the limitations of previous works. To conquer
these limitations, we propose improved network pruning methods which can successfully preserve
the robustness of the networks to large extents for compression ratios as high as 10×. In particular,
our approach can preserve 93% of benign accuracy, 92.5% of empirical robust accuracy, and 85%
of verifiable robust accuracy for 10% compression ratio with structured pruning. The gains with
structured pruning are 84.3%, 90.4%, and 73.8% respectively. Finally, we demonstrate the advantage
of proposed techniques over robust training of compact networks from scratch.
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A Detailed results for empirical robustness (era) relationship with network
pruning
In this section, we present detailed experimental study for different choices of pruning and fine-tuning loss
objectives in the network compression pipeline. We first experiment with no fine-tuning strategy in section A.1
and later present results for fine-tuning with natural and adversarial training in section A.2 and A.3 respectively.
Within each section, we experiment with VGG-16 network trained with both natural and adversarial training.
We present results for WRN-28-10 in Figure 8.
A.1 No Fine-tuning
A.2 Fine-tuning based on natural training.
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(b) Adversarially trained model
Figure 5: No fine-tuning for VGG16 network trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. The top plot shows
results for unstructured pruning while the bottom one captures results for structured pruning based
approach.
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(b) Adversarially trained model
Figure 6: Natural training based fine-tuning for VGG16 network trained on CIFAR-10 dataset.
A.3 Fine-tuning based on Adversarial training.
B Detailed results for provable robustness (vra) relationship with network
pruning.
In Fig. 9, we show the detailed results for pruning with MixTrain k = 10 on different types of pre-trained
networks fine-tuned, including regularly trained network, adversarially robust trained network, and verifiably
robust trained network. They share the same structure as CIFAR-Large. We use MixTrain with k = 10 to
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(b) Adversarially trained model
Figure 7: Adversarial training based fine-tuning for VGG16 network trained on CIFAR-10 dataset.
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(c) Fine-tuning with adversarial
training
Figure 8: Summary of key results for WRN-28-5. The model is pre-trained with adversarial training.
pre-train the verifiable robust network. For all of the pre-trained networks, their vra, era, and benign accuracy
can be found in captions.
C Training pruned models from scratch
In this section, we quantify the benefits of pruning by comparing it with pruned models which are trained from
scratch (i.e., no pre-training and fine-tuning strategy is used). Table 7 shows the advantages of latter approach
when only no adversary is presented (i.e., only natural training is used).
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(a) Naturally trained model, fine-tuned with MixTrain k = 1 (original vra 0.0%, acc
81.4%, era 0.1%, fine-tuning with k=1)
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(b) Adversarially trained model, fine-tuned with MixTrain k = 1 (original vra 0.0%,
acc 83.2%, era 69.3%)
100 50 25 10 2
Non-pruned net (%)
0
50
100
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
clean era vra
100 50 25 10 2
Non-pruned net (%)
0
50
100
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
clean era vra
(c) Robustly trained model, fine-tuned with MixTrain k = 1 (original vra 51.0%,
acc 73.4%, era 62.0%, fine-tuning with k=1).
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(d) Robustly trained model, fine-tuned with MixTrain k = 1 (original vra 51.0%,
acc 73.4%, era 62.0%, fine-tuning with k=10).
Figure 9: For CIFAR-Large model, fine-tuning based on robust training using MixTrain with unstruc-
tured pruning (left) and structured pruning (right). The robust accuracy, both era and vra are reported
with untargeted attacks.
Table 7: Comparing the benign accuracy of compact model resulted from the compression with
compact model trained from scratch using natural training.
Model Pruningratio (%)
Benign accuracy (%)
scratch fine-tuned
VGG16
50 92.7 93.8
75 89.9 91.8
90 84.7 88.9
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